NIGER DELTA MILITANCY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA UNDER PRESIDENT BUHARI’S ADMINISTRATION

Abstract

On 29 May 2015, General Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in as the President of Nigeria. The Buhari-led administration is expected to urgently tackle several challenges that have hindered economic prosperity, sustainable security and overall national development in Nigeria. These challenges include but are not limited to terrorism, violent conflicts, widespread poverty, youth unemployment, electricity shortage, and corruption. Insecurity is the greatest challenge facing the new administration of President Buhari. Since the return to democracy in 1999, traditional security threats such as violent conflicts, militancy, armed robbery and kidnapping have assumed worrisome dimensions in Nigeria

CHAPTER ONE

Background of the study

The Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. A combination of local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, the region’s share of oil revenues and its marginalization in national politics led to protests that evolved into a full-blown insurgency in 2006. That rebellion, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), severely disrupted Nigeria’s oil industry, slashing earnings from its exports, the country’s major revenue source. A June 2009 presidential amnesty for the militants ended the insurgency, restored some stability and created an opportunity for the government to address the multiple grievances and demands at their roots. That opportunity was lost to political inertia and bad governance. Many issues that triggered the conflict remain largely unaddressed.

Nigeria is endowed with enormous natural and human resources sufficient to place it among the first 20 developed countries of the world. It is Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixth largest oil producing country in the world. With a population of over 170 million people, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and its largest economy. Coupled with the possession of over 100 tertiary institutions producing more than 200,000 graduates per annum, the country possesses abundant human capital critical for national development. Despite its huge resource endowment, majority of its population wallow in abject poverty while unemployment and insecurity is growing. Its economic fortune has been dwindling due to a fall in the global price of crude oil. The result is that the country has been caught in-between affluence and affliction. Writers on Nigeria’s political evolution posit that bad leadership is a major factor why Nigeria has been reduced to a giant with clay feet.

The amnesty program, a key recommendation of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, was inaugurated by President Umaru Yar’Adua on 25 June 2009. The amnesty offer training and retraining and reintegration opportunities encouraged the insurgent groups to disarm; over 30,000 purported members signed up between October 2009 and May 2011. Since then, the amnesty office has worked to reintegrate them into productive society, primarily by placing (and sponsoring) them in vocational and higher education courses in Nigeria and abroad. As of March 2015, 15,451 had graduated, while 3,482 were still in training. About 11,200 (37 per cent of those who registered) were awaiting placement in academic or vocational training facilities and receiving a 65,000 naira (about $350) monthly stipend. Judged by its primary objective of disarming the insurgents and stabilizing the security situation in the Delta, the program has achieved significant results. Kidnappings and armed attacks against expatriates have fallen, and improved security has enabled petroleum production and exports to increase from about 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in mid-2009 to between 2.2 and 2.4 million bpd since 2011.9 It has also saved the country the estimated 3.74 billion naira (about $18.7 million) daily that it formerly spent fighting the insurgency.10 By providing more sophisticated education rather than the artisanal training delivered by most other disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs, it offers better prospects that thousands of ex-militants will find meaningful jobs and renounce violence permanently.

Nevertheless, the very expensive program has drawn criticism and still faces several challenges. First, the initial arrangement whereby ex-militant commanders collected the monthly stipends for all fighters who were in their camps then paid the “boys”, reinforced bonds that in some cases remain unbroken, giving the former commanders the ability to rally their fighters to any new cause. Secondly, as the 65,000 naira monthly stipend paid to the ex-militants is well above the 18,000 naira ($90.50) national minimum wage and most entry-level salaries, many recipients would rather receive that payment than accept a job. Ending those stipends could create new security problems. Thirdly, there is a serious mismatch between the training the former militants receive and the job market. At the end of March 2015, reportedly only 151 of the 15,451 graduates from the training programs had found jobs with credible organizations in the country. Many currently being trained have high expectations of positions in oil, gas and aviation companies, but industry sources insist there presently is limited room to absorb many job-seekers. Frustrated graduates may be tempted to return to militancy or violent crime, only now better educated and more likely capable of extracting new concessions from the federal government.

The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), the first national leader from the region, stipends and training for the former militants and arrangements with insurgency leaders kept a lid on local agitation and conflict. With Jonathan’s defeat in the March 2015 elections, the amnesty program’s likely end in December and patronage to former militant leaders terminated, local discontent is deepening, and the region risks eventually relapsing into violence.

Given the new administration, it focuses mostly on federal programs and policies, not state, local or civil society interventions that are also important for reducing tensions, addressing grievances and preventing conflict. It is based on extensive field research, including interviews with local militant leaders, politicians, security officers, civil society leaders and youth in the Delta, as well as federal government officials in the capital, Abuja. It analyses the limitations and failures of various government initiatives, highlights the risks of renewed conflict and recommends key actions President Muhammadu Buhari’s government must take to prevent a new insurgency.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

It is no news of the rejuvenation of militancy in the Niger Delta emanating from changes in policy and governance in Nigeria. It is on this note that the researcher decide to undertake this study on the activities of the Niger delta militancy and foreign investment in Nigeria. Under President Muhammadu Buhari   administration we have seen the ravaging effect of militancy in Nigeria pipe lines and other oil facilities in the Deltas. It is on this note that we want to ascertain the effect of this in Nigeria’s foreign investment.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

Militancy and insecurity are synonymous as they both have a ravaging effect on the socio-economic well being of the country’s economy. However, the main objective of this study is to ascertain the effect of the Niger delta militancy and foreign investment in Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari administration. The researcher also set out some sub objective that he wishes to achieve at the completion of the study, which are:

To evaluate the effect of the militancy in oil production

To ascertain the impact of militancy in the security of oil facility

To evaluate the relationship between militancy and foreign investment

To ascertain ways of eliminating the activities of the Niger delta militancy

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

For the successful completion of this study, the following research questions are formulated:

1. What are the effects of militancy on oil production?
2. Does activities of militancy has any effect on the security of oil facilities?

• What is the relationship between militancy and foreign investment?

1. What are the ways of eliminating militancy activities in the Niger delta?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

It is conceived that at the completion of the study the findings will be of benefit to the federal government in policy formulation, and also to the security operatives who are charge with the responsibility of securing the oil facility. The study will also be of importance to foreign investors and potential investors, and finally the study will be useful to the academia, teachers, lecturers, students, researchers and the general public.

1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The study covers the effect of Niger delta militancy and foreign investment in Nigeria under President Buhari administration. However, the study has some limitations which are;

Availability research materials: materials that the researcher require for the research work  was unavailable for the research work.

Time factor: time was not on the researchers to consult various sectors of the economy to review employees or given out questionnaire to various institutions on the effect of government revenue policies.
As we all know, time is never our friend. The time scheduled for the completion of this research thesis was too short. As a result, generating information/data was strenuous as it coincides with final year examination period, which needed attention.

Finance: this is another barrier that limited the researcher’s work.

1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Militant

Meaning “to serve as a soldier”. The related modern concept of the militia as a defensive organization against invaders grew out of the Anglo-Saxon fyrd. In times of crisis, the militiaman left his civilian duties and became a soldier until the emergency was over, when he returned to his civilian occupation.

The current meaning of militant does not usually refer to a registered soldier: it can be anyone who subscribes to the idea of using vigorous, sometimes extreme, activity to achieve an objective, usually political. A “militant (political) activist” would be expected to be more confrontational and aggressive than an activist not described as militant.

Militancy may or may not include physical violence, armed combat, terrorism, and the like.

Foreign direct investment

A foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment in the form of a controlling ownership in a business in one country by an entity based in another country. It is thus distinguished from foreign portfolio investment by a notion of direct control.

The origin of the investment does not impact the definition as an FDI: the investment may be made either “inorganically” by buying a company in the target country or “organically” by expanding operations of an existing business in that country.

Insecurity

Abraham Maslow described an insecure person as a person who “perceives the world as a threatening jungle and most human beings as dangerous and selfish; feels a rejected and isolated person, anxious and hostile; is generally pessimistic and unhappy; shows signs of tension and conflict, tends to turn inward; is troubled by guilt-feelings, has one or another disturbance of self-esteem; tends to be neurotic; and is generally selfish and egocentric.” (Maslow, 1942, pp 35). He viewed in every insecure person a continual, never dying, longing for security. Alegre (2008).

A person who is insecure lacks confidence in their own value, and one or more of their capabilities, lacks trust in themselves or others, or has fears that a present positive state is temporary, and will let them down and cause them loss or distress by “going wrong” in the future. This is a common trait, which only differs in degree between people.

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This research work is organized in five chapters, for easy understanding, as follows

Chapter one is concern with the introduction, which consist of the (overview, of the study), statement of problem, objectives of the study, research question, significance or the study, research methodology, definition of terms and historical background of the study. Chapter two highlight the theoretical framework on which the study its based, thus the review of related literature. Chapter three deals on the research design and methodology adopted in the study. Chapter four concentrate on the data collection and analysis and presentation of finding.  Chapter five gives summary, conclusion, and recommendations made of the study.

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